Under symmetric information, a job protection law which says that a principal who has hired an agent today must also employ him tomorrow can only reduce the two parties' total surplus. The law restricts the principal's possibilities to maximize her proÿt, which equals the total surplus, because she leaves no rent to the agent. However, under asymmetric information, a principal must leave a rent to her agent, and hence proÿt maximization is no longer equivalent to surplus maximization. Therefore, a job protection law can increase the expected total surplus by restricting the principal's possibilities to ine ciently reduce the agent's rent.
Introduction
In most European countries, permanent employment relationships that are protected by job security legislation are the regular case. This paper o ers a principal-agent theoretic perspective on employment protection laws. It is quite obvious that job security is a precious good. However, why is the government needed to legislate employment protection? If a permanent relationship between an employer and an employee is beneÿcial, say because the employee is risk-averse or needs incentives to invest in ÿrm-speciÿc skills, then the two parties could deliberately write a labor contract that guarantees job security to the employee. How can a job protection law increase welfare over and above the level that can be reached by private contracting? After all, it is merely a restriction on the class of contracts that the two parties may write.
1
In general, restrictions on the class of contracts that private parties may write can be desirable in the presence of externalities. For instance, welfare can be increased if cartel contracts are prohibited, because such contracts have negative externalities on the consumers, who are not contractual parties. But why should insecure or ÿxed-term employment contracts be prohibited? A possible reason is that permanent employment relationships have positive external e ects that the contractual parties do not internalize. 2 However, in what follows I will not consider any such externalities and instead only focus on the gains from trade that accrue to the employer and the employee.
The main result of the analysis will be that state-mandated employment protection can strictly increase the expected surplus that an employer and an employee together can generate. This will be demonstrated in a simple principal-agent model that does not rely on risk-aversion, incomplete contracts, search frictions, wealth constraints, or limited commitment abilities. Instead, the result will follow immediately from the presence of asymmetric information, which of course is the cornerstone of the principal -agent theory. Under symmetric information, the employer can extract the full gains from trade with the employee. Hence, a law that restricts the class of feasible contracts will reduce not only the employer's proÿt, but at the same time the total surplus generated in the employment relationship. In contrast, under asymmetric information the employer must leave an information rent to the employee. This means that the employer's proÿt is no longer equal to the two parties' total surplus. A job protection law may then decrease the employer's proÿt but simultaneously increase the total surplus, because it limits the possibilities of the employer to ine ciently dismiss the employee in order to reduce the information rent.
